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The Role of the External Auditor in the Regulation and Supervision of the UK Banking System. 
Introduction 
The need for indirect supervision1 of the banking system through the use of intermediaries such as external 
auditors has become popular over the years. About two decades ago, internal control systems would not have 
featured highly in an analysis of banks and their supervision.2 A general banker3 can no longer expect or 
hope to understand in depth all the activities which go on in a bank because change has occurred over the 
years that the necessary skills and experiences are held in individual specialist areas.4 The benefits of using 
the external auditor in the bank regulation and supervisory process include the ability of the external auditor 
to provide a wide range of resources and knowledge and acting as an intermediary for the regulator, thereby 
helping to protect the regulator's reputation and helping the regulator to avoid regulatory capture. The risks 
involved in using the external auditor include conflict of interests5, loss of information during the transfer of 
information to the regulator and higher costs.6 
The process of obtaining vital information for the FSA is discussed under the context of the rights and duties 
of auditors to report to regulators. This will highlight the reporting procedures during the Bank of England's 
regime with a less extensive discussion of the FSA's regime. The FSA's enforcement process will extensively 
discuss how external auditors help not only in obtaining vital information for the FSA, but also other tasks 
such as risk analysis and sampling procedures which external auditors use as a means of evaluating 
information for the FSA. 
An extension of the external auditor’s role depends on the nature and environment of the national 
supervisor.7 For example, the assistance that might required of the external auditor will usually be minimal  
where the banking supervisor follows an active approach, with frequent and rigorous inspection.8 If, 
however, there has been a history of less direct supervision, which is mainly based on the analysis of 
reported information provided by bank’s management, as opposed to inspection, or if supervisory resources 
are limited, the assistance that the external auditor can offer in providing assurance on the information 
obtained could be of immense benefit to the supervisor.9 
Many countries are however, are currently practising a supervisory approach which combines elements of 
inspection and analysis of reported information.10 Inspection is proving more and more demanding in terms 
of supervisory resources even as banking becomes more complex.11 As a result, many supervisory 
authorities that practice on-site inspection are being driven to place greater reliance on reported information, 
and look to the external auditor for assistance in those areas for which the auditor’s skills are partic
12
ularly 
ited.  
                                                
su
 
 
1 Indirect supervision implies a system of supervision whereby the external auditor performs the task of collecting 
information and 'directly' supervising for the regulator. Where the external auditor merely reports on information 
collected by banking staff, he does not assume any supervisory responsibilities. See 'The Relationship between 
Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors' Jan 2002 para 57 page 15 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> 
(last visited 11th July 2007)  
2 B Quinn   'The Bank of  England and the Development of Internal Control Systems'  in R Kinsella (ed) Internal 
Controls in Banking  (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1995) p 35 
3 These are usually top management of the bank such as bank directors 
4    ibid  p 37 
5  The external auditor in this situation would not only owe obligations to the bank, its shareholders but also to the 
regulator and those investors  whose interests are being safeguarded by the  regulator.   
6  E Huepkes 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor' p 12 
7 'The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors: Additional Requests for the External 
Auditor to Contribute to the Supervisory Process' January 2002 (page 12) para 64; also see 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> 
8 ibid 
9 ibid 
10 Ibid para 65 
11 ibid 
12 ibid 
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This paper focuses on how the external auditor can assist the FSA through two of its principal regulatory 
tools in the FSA's response to risk, namely supervision and enforcement. The external auditor has a vital 
role as a supervisory tool in reporting certain matters as obliged by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA) and also in reporting specific matters through annual reports.13 As an enforcement tool, 
external auditors play a key role in their functions as skilled persons. Under section 166 of the FSMA, power 
is conferred on the FSA to mandate a firm of solicitors or accountants/auditors to report to the FSA matters 
requiring provision of information under section 165 of the FSMA.14 The reports produced by external 
auditors as a result of this process are known as skilled person reports. As well as the FSA's use of external 
auditors to assist it in obtaining information, performing risk analysis, sampling and other tasks during 
enforcement procedures, the effectiveness of the FSA's use of external auditors in its off-site and on-site 
systems of supervision can be efficiently assessed  through a  holistic examination  of the way in which the 
velopments in audit independence and audit liability are then discussed before a 
onclusion is arrived at. 
BCCI and Johnson 
audit profession is regulated. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organised as follows: The first section will discuss the developments 
which have led to the present role of the audit. This section considers the watch dog nature of the auditor 
through the performance of traditional audit techniques on internal controls – a stark contrast to the lax 
attitude demonstrated through his present role of verifying financial statements. The next section will then 
analyse why the audit is of great importance and the need to restore its reputation amidst creative accounting 
practices which undermine its value. One of the vehicles required to restore such reputation is the concept of 
audit independence. This is considered in section three. Threats to auditor independence and safeguards to 
protect against such threats are then analysed before the external auditor's role in the supervisory process is 
considered. Under its role of obtaining information for the FSA, the external auditor's right and duty to 
report, statutes and standards governing those rights and duties will be analysed. The development of a 
framework for corporate governance, developments leading to the establishment of audit committees and the 
FSA's enforcement procedures will also be considered. The FSA's enforcement procedures highlight the 
immense contribution made by external auditors to the supervisory process as demonstrated in the Legal and 
General Case. Recent de
c
 
The Changing Roles of the Audit 
According to accounting literature, the traditional role of the audit was mainly the detection and prevention 
of fraud.15 The move to verification of financial statements arose from the growing investment in the 
railway, insurance and banking industry16. Suggestions have been made that this situation occurred because 
in these particular industries, the shareholding was more dispersed and more priority given to financial 
performance rather than on management's honesty.17 Bank failures such as those of 
Matthey resulted to a re-think of the objective of an audit to include the detection and prevention of fraud.18 
Evidence has been provided to support the fact that the auditor's role changed during the nineties from that 
reminiscent of a watch dog to a less vigilant and scrutinising role.19 Such evidence which include firstly, the 
widening scope of audit firm services beyond the audit function, resulted to relationships which affected the 
                                                 
13 M Blair and G Walker 'Financial Services Law' 2006 p133 
15 nking regulation and supervision' Journal of International Banking 
16 nking regulation and supervision' Journal of International Banking 
ation  (Volume 4 No 3 , 2003) 3 
19 estructure the Industry Before it 
14 Ibid p 135 
D Singh  'The role of third parties in ba
Regulation  (Volume 4 No 3 , 2003) 3 
D Singh  'The role of third parties in ba
Regul
17 ibid 
18 D. Singh  ' The role of third parties in banking regulation and supervision' at p 3 
L Cunningham 'Too Big to fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to R
Unravels'  Boston College Law School Faculty Papers Paper 165 (2006) 23 
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audit firms' independence.20 Secondly, increase in accounting irregularities during the 1990s arose in the 
form of widespread premature revenue recognition and other forms of “creative” accounting.21 Thirdly, there 
was evidence of auditor ability to influence audit quality and liability risk as illustrated through dramatic 
changes in the number of financial restatements, frequency of auditor switching and the degree of qualified 
pinions issued.22 
pared to the lax and complacent 
titude which was characteristic of the nineties.  
 
e exercise and effort. The value of carrying out these procedures is demonstrated in the following section. 
 as he believes that it 
                                                
o
 
The laxness and complacity resulting from “creative accounting” techniques has not only resulted in 
continual emphasis on auditor independence but also justifies the requirements by the US Sarbanes Oxley 
Act that auditors audit internal control over financial reporting.23 Traditional auditing techniques focus on 
internal controls and demonstrate the auditor's thorough reputation as com
at
  
Traditional auditing techniques may involve overly thorough and expensive procedures but given the 
complacent attitude that threatens to undermine the audit profession and audit quality in particular, it is worth
th
 
The Value of the Audit and Auditor Independence 
The audit is an important part of the capital market framework as it not only reduces the cost of information 
exchange between managers and shareholders but also provides a signalling mechanism to the markets that 
the information which management is providing is reliable.24 The auditor provides independent verification 
on the financial statements of a company and as a result, the audit loses its value when such independence 
which gives credibility to the financial statements, is undermined. Much of internal audit work can be useful 
to the external auditor in the audit of the financial statements - even though the external auditor is solely 
responsible for the audit report and for determining the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures. As part 
of the audit, the external auditor therefore assesses the internal audit function insofar
will be relevant in determining the nature, timing and extent of the audit procedures.25 
The primary objective of an audit is for the auditor to provide independent assurance to shareholders that the 
financial statements have been properly prepared by the directors.26 The purpose of an audit is not intended 
to detect fraud - except that which is material to the financial statements. It aims to give shareholders 
confidence in the annual accounts prepared by the directors.27 The reality and perception of auditor 
independence is essential to public confidence in financial reporting.28 Public confidence in financial 
 
20 
 received some of its illegal tax shelters; whilst both KPMG and PWC had investments in their 
ts ;ibid. 
d 
 Financial Statement Restatements:Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses and Remaining Challenges 
24 arnley 'Auditor Independence and Non audit services' p 1 see <http://www.icaew.co.uk/publicass
For example, Ernst and Young had a business partnership with its client, PeopleSoft; clients and audit committee 
members of  KPMG
audit clien
21 Ibi p 24 
22  Restatements rose to an all time record high of 160 by 1999;  ibid p 25. See also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, 
Report on
4 (2002) 
23 Ibid p 41 
V.Beattie, S Fe > ( 
25 l Auditors' Jan 2002 para 20, page 6 see 
12 July 2005) 
 ' The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' Externa
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 11 th July 2007) 
Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragrap26 h  3   
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> (July 16 2006) 
House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of public 
limited
27 
 companies in the UK at p 12 . Also see <http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ > (16 December 
28 rs : What Company Audit Is Really About'  ( Institute of 
2005) 
 V Beattie  S Fearnley and  R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doo
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markets and the conduct of public interest entities relies partly on the credibility of the opinions and reports 
iven by auditors in relation with financial audits.29  
in the supervisory process require 
a wide range of qualities such as fairness, candour, 
31
preparation of financial 
atements do not relate to questions of fact but rather to questions of judgement.34 
parties do not 
ave sufficient information to enable them judge whether the auditors are, in fact, objective.37  
g
 
Effective audits and efficient performance of the external auditor's role 
standards such as independence, objectivity and integrity to be achieved.  
Integrity is a  requirement for those acting in public interest and it is vital that auditors act and are seen to act 
with integrity.30 This requires not only honesty but 
courage, intellectual honesty and confidentiality.  
Objectivity is a state of mind which excludes bias, prejudice and compromise and which gives fair and 
impartial consideration to all matters that are relevant to the present task, disregarding those that are not.32 
Objectivity requires the auditor's judgement not to be affected by conflicts of interests and that he adopts a 
thorough approach preparing to disagree where necessary with the director's judgements.33 The necessity for 
objectivity arises due to the fact that many important issues involved in the 
st
 
The concept of independence is not the easiest to define. Definitions include :35 “the conditional probability 
of reporting a discovered breach” by DeAngelo (1981a:186); the ability to resist client pressure 
(Knapp;1985); a function of character – with characteristics of integrity and trustworthiness being essential 
(Magill and Previts; 1991); and an absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias.36  The need 
for independence arises because in many cases, users of financial statements and other third 
h
 
As well as performing similar functions, that is, the verification of the financial statements, the external 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) 18 
29 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, Objectivity and Independence paragraph  4   
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>  ( 16 July 2006); The EC sought to establish a common 
framework of independence principles through a Green Paper (EC 1996) and with the help of the Federation des 
Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE 1995,1998).  In 1998, the European Parliament approved a resolution 
supporting the EC Green Paper and the European Commission issued a Recommendation“ Statutory Auditors’ 
Independence in the EU:A Set of Fundamental Principles” on the 16 May 2002. This directive requires all firms 
listed on the stock exchange to have independent audit committees and that auditors/audit partners must be rotated. 
However, it does not deal with  the separation of auditors from consultancy work-despite the threat of non-audit 
work to the auditor’s independence. See House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence 
submitted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the 
arrangements for financial regulation of public limited companies in the UK at p 18 
30 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  7   
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> ( 12 July 2006) 
31 ibid 
32 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  9   
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> (12 July 2006) 
33 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraphs   9,11   
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> ( 14 July 2006) 
34 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph    10   
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> (15 July 2006) 
35   V Beattie  S Fearnley and  R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit Is Really About'  ( Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) 19 
36 The AICPA White Paper definition (AICPA, 1997) defines independence as an absence of interests that create an 
unacceptable risk of bias. 
37 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  13   
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> 
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auditor and the regulator also serve particular interests. The regulator works towards safeguarding financial 
stability and investor interests. On the other hand, the external auditor serves the private interests of the 
shareholders of a company. The banking supervisor is primarily concerned with maintaining the stability of 
the banking system and fostering the safety and soundness of individual banks in order to protect the 
interests of the depositors.38 Therefore, the supervisor monitors the present and future viability of banks and 
uses their financial statements in assessing their condition and performance.39 The external auditor, on the 
other hand, is primarily concerned with reporting on th
40
e bank’s financial statements ordinarily either to the 
rms 
dependence. The guidelines suggest that  this can  be  done  even  when  non-audit  services  
reaten objectivity45. However the guidelines do not identify which non-audit services undermine 
 and Independence 
f the business and services which could be provided by a number of firms. The 
it services by auditors can also result to two other types of threats namely self interest 
 threat. 
This arises when auditors have financial or other interests which might result to them  being reluctant to take 
                                                
bank’s shareholders or board of directors.  In doing so, the auditor considers the appropriateness of 
management’s use of the going concern assumption.41  
The financial audit remains an important aspect of corporate governance that makes management 
accountable to shareholders for its stewardship of a company42. The external auditor may however, have a 
commercial interest too. The debate surrounding the role of external auditors focusses in particular on 
auditor independence. A survey by the magazine “Financial Director” shows that the fees derived from audit 
clients in terms of non-audit services are significant in comparison with fees generated through auditing.43 
Accounting firms sometimes engage in a practice called “low balling” whereby they set audit fees at less 
than market rate and make up for the deficit by providing non audit services. As a result, some audit fi
have commercial interests to protect too. There is concern that these interests do not conflict with each other. 
Sufficient measures need to be in place to ensure that the external auditor's independence is not affected. 
The UK professional guidelines44 highlight that  independence is about ensuring that the audit is undertaken 
with a spirit of in
th
independence.46 
 
Threats to Objectivity
 
Non Audit Services 
Non-audit services may be defined as any services other than audit provided to an audit client by an 
auditor.47 There are three categories of non-audit services namely48: Services required by legislation or 
contract to be performed by auditors of the business; services that will be better performed by auditors 
because of their knowledge o
provision of non aud
threat and self review
Self interest Threat 
 
38  ' The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors' Jan 2002 para 46 page 12 see 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 11 th July 2007) 
39 ibid 
40 ibid 
41 ibid 
42 V.Beattie, S.Fearnley 'Auditor Independence and Non audit services' pg 1 see www.icaew.co.uk/publicass 
43  D Singh  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' Journal of International 
Banking Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003 p 8 
44 The  Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  England  and  Wales  Guide  to  Professional  Ethics; see D 
Singh  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' Journal of International Banking Regulation  
Volume 4 No 3 , 2003, at p 8 
45  D Singh  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' Journal of International 
Banking Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003  p 8 
46 ibid 
47 V.Beattie, S.Fearnley 'Auditor Independence and Non audit services' pg 1 <http://see www.icaew.co.uk/publicass> 
48 House of Commons , Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence at pp 18 and 19 . Also see 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/>  
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actions that would be adverse to the interests of the audit firm.49  
Self review Threat 
This arises when the results of a non audit service performed by the auditors or by others within the audit 
firm are included in the figures disclosed in the financial statements.50 As a result of providing non audit 
service, the audit firm is associated with aspects of the preparation of the financial statements and may be 
unable to give an objective view of relevant aspects of those financial statements.51 
 
Other threats to objectivity and independence include52: Management threat, advocacy threat, familiarity 
threat and  intimidation threat. 
Apart from the responsibility which the audit firm has in establishing policies and procedures designed to 
ensure that it ( the audit firm) and all those who are in a position to influence the conduct and outcome of the 
audit act with integrity, objectivity and independence,  the audit firm also has to identify and assess “threats” 
to auditors' objectivity and  apply procedures which would either : 
 
i) eliminate the threat; or 
ii) reduce the threat to an acceptable level.53 
 
Arrangements are well in place to deal with risks posed by non audit services to the auditor's independence. 
Firstly, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales' ethical code forbids auditors to provide 
non-audit services to audit clients if that would present a threat to independence where no sufficient 
safeguards were available.54 Secondly, under provisions of the Combined Code of corporate governance, the 
audit committee, as representatives of the shareholders, is required to supervise the relationship with the 
auditors and monitor the nature and scope of non-audit services.55 The audit committee must be sure that the 
independence and objectivity of the auditor are not compromised.56 
                                                 
49 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  28   
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> (last visited 12 July 2006) 
50 ibid 
51 ibid 
52 ibid 
53 See Ethical Standards 1 paragraph 27. Ethical Standards 5 (Non audit services provided to audit clients) paragraph 
12 also states that before the audit firm accepts a proposed engagement to provide a non-audit service to an audit 
client, the audit engagement partner should : a) Consider whether it is likely that a reasonable and informed third 
party would regard the objectives of the proposed engagement as being inconsistent with the objectives of the audit 
of the financial statements; and  
 b) Identify and assess the significance of any related threats to the auditors' objectivity, including any perceived loss 
of independence; and 
 c) Identify and assess the effectiveness of the available safeguards to eliminate the threats or reduce them to an 
acceptable level.  
54 House of Commons , Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence at p 19 . Also see 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/>  (12 February  2006) 
55 ibid 
56 Ibid ; UK Auditing Standards specifically require that for listed companies, audit engagement partners responsible 
for a company's audit must: Disclose in writing to the audit committee all relationships between the audit firm and 
the client that may affect independence and objectivity; confirm in their professional judgement, the firm's 
independence and objectivity and thirdly, the ethical code specifies that an audit appointment to a listed company 
should  not be accepted if the client provides a significant portion ( 10%) of a firm's gross income. Fourthly, 
shareholders themselves are able to assess the extent of non-audit services provided by auditors.  Companies Acts 
have for some years required the total amount of non-audit fees paid to auditors to be disclosed.  
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In addition to the above mentioned safeguards, it is worth noting that it has been concluded that there is no 
evidence confirming correlation between levels of non-audit fees and audit failures and that as a result, 
sufficient safeguards are in place.57 
Other examples of safeguards which exist in the UK to protect the independence of auditors include:58  
The provision for staff on the audit assignment to communicate concerns to a separate partner; arrangements 
for an independent partner to act  as reviewer; regular rotation of audit partners; effective interaction between 
the audit committee and the auditor and compartmentalisation of responsibilities and knowledge within the 
audit firm. Auditor independence is strengthened by systems of inspection to detect breaches of auditing 
standards and the imposition of penalties or restrictions where offences or failures have occurred.59   
 
In view of the immense contribution by external auditors to the supervisory process, it is necessary to 
consider the risks associated with their involvement and provide for measures which would safeguard against 
any potential risks or threats to their independence. The immense contribution made by external auditors will 
now be considered.  
 
The External Auditor's Role in the Supervision Process  
External auditors are better placed to carry out such procedures because of their expertise in analysing risks 
associated with internal controls in banks and firms, their ability to validate processes in the measurement of 
credit, market and operational risks under Basel II60 and their ability to undertake other specialised functions 
which are particularly necessary in a business environment in which computer technology and diverse risks 
have evolved. The FSA places great reliance on the cooperation of regulated firms to provide information 
which is timely, accurate and complete in order to be able to gauge whether a firm is complying with its 
requirements. Auditors can help facilitate efficiency within the supervisory process as they are also required 
under the FSMA to inform the FSA of certain matters of concern and have to provide annual reports to the 
FSA. The FSA in its proximity to the market and consumers would also need to be mindful of not getting 
'captured' by those it is supposed to be regulating.  
 
Due to lack of transparency, the kind of supervisory regime under which the Bank of England operated, was 
prone to regulatory capture. This was not as a result of the extent of the Bank of England's use of external 
auditors in the supervisory process. In fact, the Bank of England used more reporting accountants than the 
level used by the FSA at present. The lack of transparency resulted from its discretionary and informal 
approach to supervision. Due to lack of transparency, the kind of supervisory regime under which the Bank 
operated, a regime of informal and negotiated enforcement, was prone to two forms of abuse.61 Firstly, it 
could degenerate into the capture of the regulatory system by the regulated.62 Secondly, it could conceal 
selective enforcement and possible harsh treatment of less significant regulatees.63 In contrast, the FSA's use 
of risk based supervision facilitates a system whereby transparency is encouraged.  
As well as possessing valuable expertise and third party information, external auditors are in a better position 
to act as intermediaries between regulators and the regulated based on the Basel Committee's  
                                                 
57 ibid 
58 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of public 
limited companies in the UK p 14 . Also see   <http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ > 
59  ibid 
60  See E Huepkes 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor' p 11 
61 C Hadjiemmanuil p 182; A system of risk-based supervision is more transparent and allows for more accountability 
62 ibid 
63 ibid 
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recommendations.64 Principle 20 of the Basel Core Principles for Effective banking Supervision 'Supervisory 
Techniques' states that 'An effective banking supervisory system should consist of on-site and off-site 
supervision and regular contacts with bank management'.65 The external auditor’s role in reporting on 
information supplied by the bank's management66 or on the application of particular procedures, does not 
assume any supervisory responsibilities.67 By providing reports, this enables the supervisor to make 
judgments about the bank more effectively.68 
 
Assisting the Regulator as a Supervisory Tool in Obtaining and Reporting on Vital Information  
The Auditor's  Right to Communicate: Developments During the Bank of England's Regime 
The first time that the role of the auditor was formally addressed in British banking regulation was when the 
right to communicate was introduced in the Banking Act 1987.69 Section 47 of the Banking Act 1987 gave 
the auditor the right to report any matters of prudential concern to the Bank of England70. In its notice to 
auditors, the Bank's first example of circumstances to be reported is breach of the trigger capital ratio set by 
the Bank.71 As long as auditors had communicated in good faith, they were not considered to have breached 
any duty of confidentiality72. Apart from a duty to communicate matters of concern immediately to 
prudential supervisors, the auditor was granted powers to furnish “special” reports under sections 39 and 41 
of the Banking Act 1987. 
The Bank of England commissioned 2 types of reports namely the section 39 reports73 and section 41 
reports.74 During the course of 1995 and 1996, 647 section 39 reports and 2 section 41 reports were 
commissioned.75  The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers led to the introduction of section 39 reports in 
the Banking Act 1987. The Bank of England further responded to the failure of JMB by introducing review 
teams which visited financial institutions for two or three days and longer for complex reviews.76 The level 
of reliance placed on the accounting profession is also demonstrated through the Bank of England's Report 
for 1994/95.77 
The Bingham Report on the BCCI affair proposed changing the auditor's right to communicate into a duty.78 
The Board of Banking Supervision recommended extending section 39 reports to subsidiaries in foreign 
jurisdictions and to replace annual section 39 reports with a more flexible approach based on regulatees' 
changing circumstances.79 The relationship between supervisory authorities and the external auditors of a 
                                                 
64 See 'Additional Requests for the External Auditor to Contribute to the Supervisory Process: The Relationship 
between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors' Jan 2002 para 57 page 15  see 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 11 th July 2007) 
65  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 'Core Principles For Effective Banking Supervision' October 2006 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf> 
66  The basic responsibility for supplying complete and accurate information to the banking supervisor is to 
remain with the bank’s management; see  The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors' 
Jan 2002 para 57 page 15  see <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 11 th July 2007) 
67  ibid 
68 ibid 
69 Vieten pp 167 and 168 
70 Ibid p 167 
71 ibid 
72 Vieten  p 167 
73 These examine aspects of accounting and prudential reporting and internal control systems; see Vieten  p 169. They 
are also commissioned regularly. 
74 These are commissioned on an exceptional basis where areas of concern have been identified 
75 Vieten  p 169 
76 See Vieten  p 172 
77 At page 39; also see Vieten p 172 
78 HC 198, 1992; see Vieten  p 172 
79 HC 673,1995 p 261  ; see Vieten p 172 
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credit institution and the duties of these auditors was identified as an important lesson from the BCCI case.80 
Because of auditors' access to financial undertakings' accounts and other essential material, they are in a 
position to play an important role in the overall supervisory process.81 
 
Should there be a Right to Communicate or a Duty to Communicate? 
Generally producers of consumables owe a “duty of care” to third parties. However it was held in Caparo 
Industries plc v Dickman and Others82 that, generally, auditors only owe a duty of care” to the company as a 
legal person and that they do not owe a “duty of care” to any individual shareholder, creditor, pension 
scheme members or any other stakeholder.83   
The government has been criticised for failing to give more protection to audit stakeholders as the regulating 
accounting bodies often campaign to demand liability and other concessions for auditing firms.84 It has also 
not fully considered why auditing firms would have any economic incentives to reflect on the negative 
consequences of their activities – especially in the absence of a “duty of care”.85  
The DTI having joint responsibility for regulating the UK auditing industry, has also been criticised for not 
having adequate staff to perform duties of examining unexpected corporate collapses and frauds.86 The 
inspectors it appoints to examine these collapses have been said to rarely examine the impact of 
organisational culture and values on audit failures.87 Prem Sikka adds that the threat of a punitive action by 
the DTI could create economic incentives for accounting firms to reflect on the consequences of there 
actions – as a reduction in their revenue (as a result of fines incurred) would make them think twice before 
indulging in acts with negative consequences. Since the Companies Act 1989, the accountancy bodies have 
formally been given powers to act as regulators of the UK auditing industry and Prem Sikka states that 
accounting bodies could call for changes to the legal and institutional structures in order to persuade auditing 
firms to revise values that influenced an audit.88 However, they are influenced by pursuit of their economic 
interests89 - hence a  situation involving a 'conflict of interest' arising. The issue relating to the aftermath of 
BCCI is mentioned following the Bingham Report where Lord Justice Bingham proposed a statutory duty to 
be owed by the auditor, and the auditing industry still opposed the imposition of any “duty” to report 
financial irregularities to the regulators90. 
 
The use of auditors as bank examiners has transformed the traditional relationship between auditors and their 
clients. In cases where auditors acted on behalf of regulators  and were not directly employed by banks, they 
were also like third parties. However where auditors were employed by banks (their clients), a duty of 
confidentiality was still owed to the banks and this would be breached if they communicated information to 
the Bank of England. As a result, the Banking Act 1987 removed the auditor's duty of confidentiality to their 
                                                 
80 . JF Mogg ' The Bank of  England and the Development of Internal Control Systems'  in R Kinsella (ed) 
Internal Controls in Banking  (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1995)31 
81  JF Mogg ' The Bank of  England and the Development of Internal Control Systems'  in R Kinsella (ed) 
Internal Controls in Banking  (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1995)32 
82 (1990) 1 All ER HL 568 
83 See House of Commons Select Treasury Committee 'Further Memorandum Submitted by Professor Prem Sikka 'The 
Institutionalisation of Audit Failures : Some Observations'  p 21 
84 See House of Commons Select Treasury Committee 'Further Memorandum Submitted by Professor Prem Sikka 'The 
Institutionalisation of Audit Failures : Some Observations'  p 21 
85 See House of Commons Select Treasury Committee 'Further Memorandum Submitted by Professor Prem Sikka 'The 
Institutionalisation of Audit Failures : Some Observations' p  21 
86 ibid 
87 Ibid  
88 See House of Commons Select Treasury Committee, Further Memorandum Submitted by Professor Prem Sikka 'The 
Institutionalisation of Audit Failures : Some Observations'  p 22 
89 Ibid  p 22 
90 ibid 
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client institution in relation to matters communicated to the Bank in good faith. 
Secondary legislation introducing a duty to report apparent irregularities under appropriate circumstances 
came into force on the 1st May 1994.91 Under domestic provisions, bank auditors and reporting accountants 
were obliged to report to the Bank their concerns whenever they had reasonable cause to believe that any of 
the minimum criteria for authorisation as a deposit-taker had been breached.92 
The prudential returns of authorised institutions and meetings between their senior management and 
supervisors were the Bank of England's main sources of information.93 However the Bank expected bank 
auditors and reporting accountants to play a direct role in the regular supervisory process. Although the 
Banking Act 1987 paved way for direct bilateral communication between bank auditors and the Bank of 
England, the Bank recognised that accountants should not be asked to act in ways which would undermine 
their professional relationship with their clients and  accordingly continued to put primary responsibility for 
conveying any vital information on the authorised institutions themselves.94  
 
The Financial Reporting Council  
In 1991, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), and its subsidiaries were established to address problems in 
the UK related to the quality of financial reporting.95 The previous regime had been inadequate as accounting 
standards were flexible, compliance was poor and no effective enforcement mechanisms were in place to 
deal with directors who breached accounting standards.96 The pressure faced by auditors from directors and 
creative accounting were major issues. Parliament delegated a lot of reforms to self-regulatory bodies. A 
system of self regulation is also likely to be more susceptible to regulatory capture97. 
Apart from the regulatory reforms which involved the introduction of the FRC, the development of a 
framework for corporate governance took place and such developments led to the establishment of audit 
committees, concepts such as the separation of duties between chairman and chief executive and an emphasis 
on the need for non-executive directors. 
 
Corporate governance 
Collapses such as those of Maxwell, BCCI and Polly Peck resulted in changes to financial reporting, 
corporate governance and audit. Three key themes emerge form the lessons learned and they include:98 
substance over form, transparency and the management of risk. The emphasis on internal control and risk 
management emerged from realisation that due to change in the business environment, even effective 
safeguards may be insufficient to eliminate all possibility of failure.99 
                                                 
91 Accountants  (Banking Act 1987) Regulations 1994, S.I. 1994/524 ; see Hadjiemmanouil  p172 
92 Ibid  p 172 
93 Hadjiemmanouil  p 174 
94 Hadjiemmanouil  p 174 
95 V Beattie  S Fearnley and  R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit Is Really About'  ( Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) 6 
96 ibid 
97 See J Godfrey and I Langfield - Smith  'Regulatory Capture in the Globalisation of Accounting Standards'   WPG 
04-08 
98 House of Commons , Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence  p 17 . Also see 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ > (12 Aug 2005) 
99 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of public 
limited companies in the UK p 17 . Also see <http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ > (17 December 
2005) and  House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence Memorandum submitted by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants  in England and Wales  p 4 
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The Financial Reporting Council's aim is to provide confidence on corporate reporting and governance.100 
Many definitions have been suggested as to what constitutes corporate governance. Whilst Keasy and 
Wright101 define it as the examination of the “structures and processes associated with production,decision-
making,control and so on within an organisation, the Cadbury Committee defined it as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. Following financial scandals such as those of Polly Peck and BCCI, 
the Cadbury Committee was set up in 1991 by the Financial Reporting Council, the London stock Exchange 
and the accountancy profession to address the financial aspects of corporate governance.102 The two key 
aspects of governance are: 103 Supervision and monitoring of management performance (the enterprise 
aspect) and ensuring accountability of management to shareholders and other stakeholders (the 
accountability aspect). 
 
The Cadbury Report made important references to aspects of internal control systems in the context of all 
public companies.104 The Cadbury Report also highlighted that the low level of confidence in financial 
reporting and auditing was caused by :105 The absence of a clear framework whereby the directors reviewed 
the company's internal controls; the looseness of accounting standards; and pressures on auditor 
independence. 
 
The report's recommendations were presented as a voluntary Code of Best Practice.106 Compliance with the 
code was however made compulsory by the LSE for listed companies after June 1993.107 Recommendations 
include:108 That board of directors include a significant number of independent, non-executive directors and 
that an audit committee comprising independent directors be formed; that audit committee should (i) Review 
financial statements before submission to the full board (ii) Ensure adequate resources for the internal audit 
function and co-ordination of such function with the external auditors (iii)Appoint and assess remuneration 
of the external auditors; that the board report on the effectiveness of internal controls and he company's 
going concern status and the external auditor review this report. 
 
The Cadbury Report was the first of a series of reports to strengthen corporate governance. Other reports 
include : The Rutterman Report (1994) which recommended that directors disclose the key procedures that 
they had established to provide effective internal financial control;109 the Greenbury Report (1995) which 
recommended the establishment of a remuneration committee comprising non-executive directors and the 
publication of information on directors' remuneration and compensation in the annual report;110 ; the Hampel 
Committee's Report (1998) which reviewed the implementation of the Cadbury Code to ensure that its 
                                                 
100  See FRC Annual Report 2005/2006 
101 See K Keasy and M Wright  'Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance : An Editorial'  Accounting 
and Business  Research , 23 (91A) p 291 
102 V Beattie  S Fearnley and  R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit Is Really About'  ( Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) 27 
103 V Beattie  S Fearnley and  R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit Is Really About'  ( Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001)26 
104 B Quinn  ' The Bank of  England and the Development of Internal Control Systems' in R Kinsella (ed) Internal 
Controls in Banking  (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1995)  35 
105 V Beattie  S Fearnley and  R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit Is Really About'  ( Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) p 27 
106 ibid 
107 ibid 
108 Ibid  p 27 
109 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of 
public limited companies in the UK p 8 . Also see <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ > ( 10 Jan 2006) 
110 ibid 
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original purpose was being achieved111 and the Turnbull Report which builds on corporate governance – 
turning it into a positive management vehicle for risk management and corporate reporting.112 The Turnbull 
Committee recommended a risk-based approach to establishing a sound based system of internal controls.113 
The link between companies' objectives, internal control and risk management in the Turnbull Report which 
requires directors to examine their control of the company on a regular basis further strengthens corporate 
governance.114 
In October 2005, an updated version of “Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code “- 
also known as the Turnbull Guidance was published and took effect for financial years beginning on or after 
1 January 2006.115 
 
Audit Committees 
The Cadbury Report highlighted the value of audit committees as internal monitoring device supportive of 
good corporate governance116. Audit committees were also seen as a mechanism to ensure that an 
appropriate relationship existed between the auditor and the management whose financial statements were 
being audite 117d.   
                                                
Recent Pricewaterhouse survey of chief executive officers (CEOs) and audit committee chairmen of the 
FTSE 250 companies revealed ten characteristics that the “best” audit committees had in 
common.118External auditors and audit committees have significant roles to play in ensuring directors' 
accountability. The Auditing Practices Board notes the potential importance of audit committees in both 
enhancing the value of external audit to shareholders and helping to re-inforce auditor's objectivity and 
commitment to high quality auditing.119 The Hampel Report also notes that audit committees form an 
essential safeguard of auditor independence.120 
 
 
 
111 ibid 
112 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence; Appendix 8; Memorandum from the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy at p 2 
113 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of 
public limited companies in the UK at at pg 10 . Also see <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ > (12 
January 2006) 
114 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of 
public limited companies in the UK at pg 11 
  . Also see <http://wwwww.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ > ( 12 January 2006) 
115  See FRC Annual Report 2005/2006  p17 
116 V Beattie  S Fearnley and  R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit Is Really About'  ( Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) 29 
117 ibid 
118 V Beattie  S Fearnley and  R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit Is Really About'  ( Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) 29. These are as follows : That non executive directors have 
relevant industry experience; that there should exist at least some members with a sound grasp of current 
developments in financial markets; that there be openness to regular training; that there be distinct appointment 
policies and criteria,succession planning and membership rotation; that there be clear delineation between their role 
and that of the full board; that there be clear brief and strategies for setting an appropriate control culture within their 
organisations; that there be regular, clearly structured meetings held at least four times a year; that there exist regular 
flow of relevant,timely information from company executives; that at least annually, aprivate meeting between each 
of the external and internal audit leaders be held ; and for self-assessment procedures to exist.    
119  APB, 1996, Next Steps   S Fearnley p 30 
120  See paragraph  6.9 
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Enforcement by the FSA 
The FSA, in considering disciplinary action, has tried to focus on the organisation concerned as opposed to 
individuals.121 At the same time, considerable efforts are being made to highlight concerns which emanate 
from the apparent lack of management oversight.122 The difficulty in reconciling the desire of senior 
management to operate a compliant business and the ability of the organisation to deliver according to the 
standards expected by the FSA has been attributed partly to inadequate training, processes or understanding 
of allocated responsibilities.123 
In order for the enforcement tool to be effective, it must justify the act for which it has been imposed. As 
mentioned previously, the public “naming and shaming” by means of press communication. is very effective 
as companies will try to avoid their name and reputation from being tarnished. However, as the Legal and 
General Case  has highlighted, not all regulated institutions may accept such sanctions.  
Following the Legal and General Case, an Enforcement Process Review was set up to review the use of, 
approach to and decision-making process for supervisory actions and enforcement actions to address 
breaches of regulatory requirements and, where appropriate, to make recommendations.124 The review 
evaluated the lessons from the FSA’s experience over the last three years under the Financial Services & 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) regime including the comments of the Tribunal in the Legal & General case but 
did not explore any options which would require changes to FSMA.125 The review considered the procedures 
followed by supervisors, enforcement staff and decision makers in considering possible breaches of statutory 
or regulatory requirements, and the nature and extent of the communications and interactions between them; 
the role and involvement of senior FSA management throughout these processes; options for making 
regulatory decisions based on a fair procedure by persons separate from the investigators; and the 
accountability of decision makers to the FSA Board. 
Recommendations made to the FSA Board following the Legal and General Case include four key principles 
for the FSA's enforcement process review that have driven the Review’s recommendations and these are:126 
That the FSA should provide: a clear view of its holistic approach to the use of enforcement; adequate 
safeguards and controls to help ensure balance and fairness during the investigation phase127; transparency 
for those subject to enforcement action so that they are well-informed about the case they have to answer and 
the evidence on which it is based; and clarity as to the distinction (required by FSMA) between those who 
investigate a case and those who decide128. 
                                                 
121   R Turner 'The Interaction between FSA Enforcement Action and Compliance Culture: A Help or a 
Hindrance?' Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance Volume 13 Number 2 2005, Henry Stewart 
Publications at p 144 
122 ibid 
123  ibid 
124   <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> at p 65 
125  ibid 
126  <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> pp 13 -15 (last visited 10 June 2007) 
127  As the FSA is a risk-based regulator, it has to focus its limited resources on those issues which are likely to 
have greatest impact on its statutory objectives. As a valid enforcement tool, a practical consequence of the risk 
based approach  is that the FSA cannot, and does not, attempt to investigate every rule breach.The FSA instead, 
selects cases carefully, according to their seriousness and its priorities. The Review recommends no change to this 
approach but it is important that the FSA continues to explain how it will use enforcement to help meet its objectives 
and what the practical consequences of this are for firms and consumers. 
 To help facilitate the decision-making process functions most effectively, investigations must be of a high quality 
and any alleged breaches properly supported by evidence. A number of recommendations to strengthen the 
investigation process and one which is particularly recommended by the Review, is that before a case is referred to 
the decision makers, there be a thorough legal review by lawyers in the Enforcement Division who are not part of 
the investigation team. This is not generally current practice; ibid 
 
128 In order to operate fairly and in order to be seen as operating fairly, there must be separation between those 
who investigate possible rule breaches and those who decide whether the conduct in question should be sanctioned 
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Other recommendations include the fact that the FSA is to continue to promote transparency about its risk-
based approach to enforcement and the consequences flowing from it, particularly for case 
selection.129 The FSA Board and the Executive are to consider at least once a year, the approach to 
enforcement and how this tool can be utilised to help achieve its overall objectives.130 The FSA's 
enforcement approach for medium-sized and smaller firms is also to be developed and communicated to 
complement its approaches for the large 131r and for the smallest firms.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
  
Expected Effect  of Recommendations 
Greater confidence in the FSA on the part of regulated firms and individuals, encouragement of self-
reporting, remedial action and co-operation will be facilitated by improved enforcement procedures.132 There 
is a danger that firms and individuals may react by introducing over-elaborate procedures to protect 
themselves from any risk of being thought to have breached an FSA requirement where there are concerns  
about the FSA’s enforcement process in terms of case selection, conduct of the investigation or the decision-
making process itself.133 The changes recommended by the Review will not only help reduce any such ‘over-
compliance’ that may exist but consumers will also benefit in that the more judicious and well respected the 
enforcement process is, the more it may encourage better compliance by regulated firms and individuals 
without recourse to enforcement action.134 
It is anticipated that more cases will be settled earlier as a result of the Review’s recommendations which 
consequently should reduce costs and assist consumers, both in terms of securing redress earlier and sending 
clear reminders to firms about the standards which the FSA expects of them.135 Where cases do proceed to 
the RDC, the net effect of these recommendations will be to add to the overall costs of the FSA’s 
enforcement process hence making it lengthier.136 
 
The Role of the External Auditor as an Enforcement Tool in the Regulatory Process. 
According to statistics, the FSA uses the enforcement tool selectively and this is consistent with the fact that 
the FSA is not an enforcement-led regulator. Evidence also shows that the FSA has decided a majority of 
rule breaches by firms through supervisory tools rather than enforcement action.137 The reason for the 
selective use of the enforcement tool can be attributed to the fact that it is a relatively expensive tool. As well 
as highlighting the importance of the FSA's reliance on work carried out by external auditors and the 
importance of verifying such work carried out by external auditors, the Legal and General Case138 also 
contributed to the debate about the need for greater reliance on on-site supervision by the FSA. The case 
 
within the FSA's enforcement process. This fundamental distinction in respect of decision-making is required by 
FSMA, but its terms are sufficiently wide to allow the FSA considerable flexibility as to how it achieves this. 
 Currently, the FSA facilitates this separation by entrusting the more foundational and contentious regulatory 
decision making to the RDC. The RDC is a Committee of the FSA’s Board, but operationally independent of it. 
Apart from the Review recommending that the RDC be maintained and that its membership continue to include 
practitioners and non-practitioners, the FSA Board is also to maintain its current policy of non intervention in, or 
attempting to influence, the RDC’s individual decisions; ibid 
 
129  ibid p 29 
130  ibid 
131 ibid 
132   <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> p 63 
133  ibid 
134  ibid 
135 ibid 
136  ibid 
137  ibid p 17 
138  Legal and General Assurance Society (L & G) v FSA 
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highlighted that the presence of an opinion from a skilled person – in particular one who works for the 
regulated firm and  is also paid by that firm, should merely assist in informing the FSA's decision making 
and should not act as a substitute to relieve the FSA from reaching its own decisions.139  
 
The Reporting Accountant (Skilled Persons) 
Section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 deals with the powers of the FSA to obtain a 
report by a skilled person (reporting accountant) to assist the FSA in performing its functions under FSMA 
2000. Under sections 167 and 168 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the FSA also has the 
powers to appoint competent persons to carry out investigations. The differences between the roles of 
reporting accountants (now known as skilled persons) and competent persons are demonstrated by the bearer  
of the costs for work carried out by these persons. For work undertaken by skilled persons, the bank bears the 
cost directly whilst for work undertaken by competent persons, the FSA bears the cost.140 The role of the 
reporting accountant has become so important that it will be incorporated into the entire regulated sector.141  
Even though skilled persons are usually approved by the FSA, the role is usually performed by auditors of 
the regulated firm.142 This raises the question of independence since both roles of auditors of the regulated 
firm and skilled persons employed by the FSA (reporting accountants) are distinct roles which still overlap 
occasionally.143  
The normal relationship between the external auditor and the audited bank needs to be safeguarded.144 If no 
other statutory requirements or contractual arrangements governing the external auditor’s work exist, all 
information flows between the banking supervisor and the auditor are usually chanelled through the bank 
except in exceptional circumstances.145 As a result, the banking supervisor will request the bank to arrange to 
obtain the information it requires from the auditor and such information will be submitted to the supervisor 
through the bank.146 In addition, the tasks that the banking supervisor requires of the external auditor 
need to be within the auditor’s technical and practical competence.147  
 
Measures have been adopted by the FSA to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest between 
the auditors of the regulated firm who are commissioned by the FSA as skilled persons but are paid by the 
regulated firm. Chapter 5 of the FSA Supervision Manual provides examples of circumstances where the 
FSA may use skilled persons. The use of skilled person reports requires compatibility with the circumstances 
envisaged by s166 of FSMA and with the further guidance set out in the Supervision and Enforcement 
manuals.148 The FSA may nominate or approve the appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person 
if it is cost effective to do so but also takes into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to the 
                                                 
139  See 'Drawing Conclusions From Skilled Person Reports'  p 37  para 5.38 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf> 
140  See J. Hitchins, M.Hogg and D.Mallett  'Banking : A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide' 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  at p 295 
141   D Singh  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' Journal of International 
Banking Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003 p 9 
142  ibid 
143 ibid 
144  For this and other safeguards, see  ' The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External 
Auditors' Jan 2002 para 58 page 15, pages 15-17    <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 11 th July 
2007) 
145  ibid 
146  ibid 
147 Ibid para 61 page 16 
148    http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf at p 36; The SUP5.3 and ENF2.3.11 
sections of the FSA Handbook set out wide range of circumstances for which a skilled person report may be suitable 
and the use of such a report for investigative (i.e. information gathering) purposes is, in the FSA’s view, clearly 
contemplated both by FSMA and its own guidance; ibid 
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matter to be reported on. There are also defined and limited circumstances in which a firm can use skilled 
persons.149 The increased use of on site supervision with external auditors paid for by the FSA, would 
however reduce the potential problems that could arise where the FSA uses auditors of  regulated firms as 
skilled persons.  
Other provisions which should assist the FSA's enforcement process include statutory powers being 
conferred by sections 165-169 and section 284 of the FSMA. These deal with the right of approval or 
removal, and the right to commission an independent audit to help the banks in ensuring that external 
auditors with the required experience, resources and skills are appointed to perform their duties.150 
 
Recent Developments in Audit Independence and Audit Liability 
A post Enron consequence is the decline in auditors' undertaking consultancy or non-audit services and an 
increased perception of auditor independence.151 Post Enron developments, in particular the US Sarbanes – 
Oxley Act meant that financial services firms with a US listing were not allowed to have their auditors 
undertaking consultancy work.152 Section 166 skilled persons' reports being commissioned by the FSA and if 
undertaken by auditors, arguably should not be classified as “consultancy”.153 However if the FSA perceived 
a conflict of interest, it had the power to require others to be appointed.154 
The problems at Equitable Life and Independent Insurance in the UK, and the failures of Enron and others in 
the US with the demise of Arthur Andersen, one of the former Big Five accountancy practices has increased 
audit partners' awareness of risk and the consequences of making incorrect judgments.155 Directors, 
particularly non-executive directors are increasingly aware of the rewards and risks linked with greater 
responsibilities as a result of changes to the Combined Code of corporate governance following Higgs156 and 
Smith.157 The UK government noted these concerns and issued a consultation document on director and 
auditor liability.158 It can be said that unless efforts are made towards limiting liability, it could be harder or 
even impossible to employ the services of external auditors and non executive directors of financial services 
without a substantial increase in their remuneration.159 Following the publication of the Penrose Report and 
potential liabilities surrounding Equitable Life, the specific role of auditors is an important research area.160 
It is appropriate to use external auditors to perform direct supervisory functions in the supervisory process 
even where risks of conflict may exist - provided there are safeguards to protect against such risks161. 
However external auditors used in this way should not also be protected by the immunity that shields 
                                                 
149  According to chapter 5 of the Supervision Manual, the FSA stated that firms are to appoint skilled persons 
only for specific purposes; not to use them as a matter of routine;to use skilled persons only after having considered 
alternatives; to use skilled persons because of the added value to be gained due to their expertise or knowledgea and 
not because of resource restraints; to take into account cost implications and to use the tool in a focused and 
proportionate way. 
150  See E Huepkes p 10 
151 P Dewing and P O Russell The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK Financial 
Services Supervision  Institute  of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  (2005)116 
152  Ibid p 116 
153  ibid 
154  ibid 
155  ibid 
156  D Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors 2003 Department of Trade and 
Industry, London 
157  R Smith Audit Committees Combined Code of Governance : A Report and Proposed Guidance by an FRC-
appointed group (2003) chaired by Sir Robert Smith FRC, London 
158  The DTI document : DTI Director and Audit Liability : A Consultative Document, (2003b), London 
159  P Dewing and P O Russell The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK Financial 
Services Supervision  Institute  of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  (2005) 117 
160  ibid 
161  In particular, regulators should also play a more proactive role in the supervisory process and be involved not 
only in the investigations but also the whole enforcement process. 
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regulators from tort of negligence actions. In addition, the FSA should have some form of responsibility for 
loss caused to depositors as a result of its negligence – as is the case in Germany and Italy. 
 
Audit Liability 
Auditors should be held more accountable for negative consequences of their actions. Present situation of the 
law does not help provide an incentive for them to be accountable for their actions. 162 The government has 
been criticised for failing to give more protection to audit stakeholders as the regulating accounting bodies 
often campaign to demand liability and other concessions for auditing firms.163 Prem Sikka adds that the 
threat of a punitive action by the DTI could create economic incentives for accounting firms to reflect on the 
consequences of their actions – as a reduction in their revenue, due to fines incurred, would make them think 
twice before indulging in acts with negative consequences.  
In contrast, Huepkes 164 argues that the threat of litigation could lead to further concentration in the auditing 
industry and also increase the trend towards defensive auditing – whereby audit partners tend to interprete 
rules prescriptively rather than exercising subjective judgement. Whilst some evidence supports the fact that 
concentration encourages specialisation which reduces financial misstatement risk, other findings show that 
having a large number of audit firms reduces the risk of a dominant firm establishing practices which could 
encourage low standard financial reporting.165 
The issue of further concentration in the auditing industry has also provided an interesting forum for debates 
relating to government intervention to bail out any of the Big Four audit firms given the potential 
consequences of having a Big Three. Even though Arthur Andersen was allowed to fail, many large audit 
firms still believe that they are “too big to fail” and it is not irrational for such firms to think so given the 
potential effects of having a Big Three.166 Apart from the moral hazard problem which could result from a 
“too big to fail” attitude, there is also the neglect of smaller institutions as a result of rescuing large 
organisations.167 The use of financial statement insurance (FSI) has been suggested as a means of improving 
the effectiveness of auditing and helping to neutralise moral hazard.168 It is also considered to be a better 
alternative to liability insurance.169  
 
CONCLUSION 
It is appropriate to use external auditors to carry out direct supervisory functions in the supervisory process 
even where risks of conflict may exist - provided there are safeguards to protect against such risks170.The 
Legal and General Case resulted not only in a review of the FSA's enforcement process, but also led to a 
                                                 
162  See Caparo v Dickman (1990) 1 All ER 568-608;  Caparo v Dickman highlights the fact that there are 
limitations to what an auditor is responsible for 
163   See House of Commons Select Treasury Committee, Further memorandum submitted by Professor Prem Sikka 
'The Institutionalisation of Audit Failures : Some Observations' at p 21 
164 See EHG Huepkes ' The External Auditor and the bank Supervisor : “ Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?”    
Journal of Banking Regulation, Volume 7 No 1 / 2 2005 at pg 10 
165  See Cunningham “Too Big To Fail” pg 33 
166 Arthur Andersen's demise and KPMG's survival has also encouraged many large audit firms to believe that 
they are too big to fail. Such belief can present moral hazard even if shared by few members of the audit 
engagement team. Another concern is that  Arthur Andersen's exit and KPMG's survival may be doing more to 
impair audit quality than Sarbanes Oxley is doing to improve it.  For more on this, See Cunningham “Too Big To 
Fail”  pp  36-38 
167  ibid 
168 Ibid p 58; At first it was suggested that Financial Statement Insurance (FSI) be made a voluntary rather 
mandatory component of US federal securities regulation. 
169 Ibid p 59 
170  In particular, regulators should also play a more proactive role in the supervisory process and be involved not 
only in the investigations but also the whole enforcement process. 
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realisation that the FSA needed to perform a more proactive role in verifying the external auditor's work. The 
regulator should not rely solely on the work of the external auditor but should also be involved in the 
investigative processes and on-site examinations. This would help safeguard against the risks of using 
external auditors as direct supervisors in a system of indirect supervision by regulators, that is, using external 
auditors as intermediaries in the supervision process. Supervisors should have measures of validating the 
information they receive either through on-site inspections or the use of external auditors. On-site work, 
whether done by the banking supervisor’s own staff or commissioned by the supervisor but undertaken by 
external auditors, is designed to provide independent verification of whether an adequate internal control 
system, meeting the specific criteria the supervisor mandates, exists at individual banks and whether the 
information provided by banks is reliable.171 
 
Debates still persist, not only in relation to the actual threats to the auditor's independence but also in relation 
to the safeguards which exist to protect against such threats. The provision of non audit services by the 
external auditor has always been a subject of debate. Following the collapse of Enron, many argued that the 
provision of non-audit services (consultancy services) by Arthur Andersen had caused Enron's problems. 
However reports showed that off-balance sheet instruments had created the problems.  
Debates revolving round mandatory rotation also proves that mandatory rotation of auditors may be 
detrimental. A cost benefit analysis of mandatory rotation of auditors is necessary before deciding on 
whether or not to implement it.. There is also the question of how much familiarity the external auditor is 
expected to have before being deemed as having too much familiarity with the firm he audits. Instead of 
rotating audit partners of firm (since the knowledge acquired from a firm by an auditor is valuable), why not 
rotate financial directors or company executives that deal with audit engagement partners/ external auditors? 
Companies should have a policy of rotating their finance directors or persons in contact with auditors after a 
certain period of time. In addition, since cost of acquiring a new external auditor is highest in the first year of 
engagement, techniques could be employed to help enable the auditor acquire knowledge of the business at a 
quicker pace. These techniques could include training sessions organised by the company via a company 
trained employee to help the external auditor improve his knowledge about that company. These sessions 
should not be costly – in comparison to the alternative of a previous auditor who could help train the newly 
engaged external auditor during the first year of his audit work. Here the issue relates to cost and who is able 
to educate the newly appointed auditor at the cheapest and most efficient available means. An external 
auditor with a  high level of integrity would also perform as well in one company where he spent only five 
years as in another company where he spent twenty years. This due to the fact that he would not allow his 
sense of integrity to be compromised as a result of additional services or any other factors which would 
compromise his independence. In such a case, it could be argued that mandatory rotation would be a wasteful 
exercise. 
 
The past few years have seen a growing trend towards the focus on audit liability.172 This is not to imply that 
                                                 
171   ' The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors' Jan 2002 para 41 , page 10 
see <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 11 th July 2007) 
172  See News reporters  'The year that was 2005 ' Accountancy Age  ( 15 December 2005); P. Grant ' Bill could 
mean jail for innocent auditors'  Accountancy Age  (2 June 2005) ;  P. Grant  'Auditors' liability wishes in company 
law bill' Accountancy Age ( 17 March  2005) ;  P. Grant  'Auditors to get proportionate liability'  Accountancy Age ( 
18 July 2005) ; P. Grant  'A bit of a liability' Accountancy Age (28 July 2005) ;  P. Grant  'Investors fear liability cap 
by the back door '  Accountancy Age ( 28 July 2005) ; S. Perrin 'Duty Bound'  Financial Director (24 November 
2005);  P. Grant  'Reform means audit fees should fall : minister'  Accountancy Age ( 11 November 2005) ; P . Grant 
'Watchdog urged to lead on  liability'  Accountancy Age ( 25 August 2005) 
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audit independence has lost its importance or is less important than audit liability. A lot of work and 
improvements on audit independence have been carried out over the years and there should be an ongoing 
process of review and further efforts aimed at improvement. However, there has also been a realisation that 
more work is needed in the area of audit liability. Unless there are punitive measures to deter an auditor or 
audit firm from the negative consequences of its actions, efforts by the Sarbanes Oxley Act and other various 
legislation to improve audit quality may be in vain. The creation of an audit firm similar in size to that of the 
Big Four, through the conversion of a large medium sized audit firm and aided by governmental funds could 
help create an alternative situation similar to that which existed when the Big Five were still in operation. 
This would also send signals to the Big Four that they are not too big too fail and that an alternative 
replacement firm could be set up should one of the Big Four fail to comply with audit requirements. 
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